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Abstract
Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the 
only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving 
this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have 
been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of 
free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit 
poorly with his evolutionary theory and naturalist commitments. In particular, his so-called “intuition pumps” 
seem to rely on the assumption that reality will have a compositional bottom layer where appearance and 
reality coincide. I argue that instead of positing this and other “unexplained explainers” we should allow for 
the heretical possibility that there might not be any absolute bottom, smallest substances or universal laws, but 
relational interactions all the way down. Through the details of Dennett’s own account of the importance of 
horizontal transmission in evolution and the causal efficacy of epistemically limited but complex layered “selves,” 
it is argued that our autonomy is linked to the ability to affect reality by controlling appearances.
Keywords
Free will, determinism, compatibilism, naturalism, evolution, Dennett, causality, emergence, time, appearance-
reality, process philosophy, action, choice, autonomy, self, metaphysics
Introduction: A tension in Dennett’s compatibilism 
Dan Dennett has over the past three decades developed and argued for an 
evolutionary and naturalist view of free will (Dennett 1984 & 2003). The core idea is that 
over evolutionary time, and through myriads of small and massively complex biological 
and cultural selections, the ability of voluntary control—what we call free will—has 
gradually evolved. Free will under Dennett’s interpretation is simply the adaptive ability 
to anticipate outcomes and to flexibly exert control over factors in the world according to 
ones preferences, perceptions and deliberations. Beyond his discussion of how the ability 
of reason-based voluntary control has evolved, Dennett has spent considerable energy 
arguing that this kind of ‘freedom’ is 1) utterly compatible with determinism and 2) the 
kind worth wanting. He, in other words, defends a compatibilist position and works hard 
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to dispel the incompatibilists, be they hard determinists or libertarians, who all claim that 
“true” free will must involve some kind of indeterminism, and hence some kind of denial 
of determinism.
Dennett’s view of free will might indeed be compatible with determinism. However, 
I shall in this article argue that his historical and perspectival evolutionary story of action 
choice and normativity would invite us to think beyond the classic determinism and 
indeterminism dichotomy, toward an emergentist or interactivist account. Further, I 
suggest that such an alternative would be more empirically plausible and, by way of it’s 
temporality, makes room for a free will theory that even some indeterminists might find 
worth wanting.
Throughout his writings, Dennett employs a series of characteristic toy models 
or “intuitions pumps” as he calls them: “Intuition pumps are cunningly designed to 
focus the readers attention on “the important” features, and to deflect the reader from 
bogging down on hard to follow details” (Dennett 1984, 12). I propose that we might 
want to use a bit of Dennett’s own methodology on himself and “turn the knobs” on 
his intuition pumps to see what is doing the work. Following his advice, I will “go slow 
where others go fast” and argue that his atomistic and compositional metaphors might 
be doing a lot of the heavy lifting in his compatibilist picture. I point to tensions within 
Dennett’s own account between his keen eye to the causal role of layered heterogeneous 
inners, as well as the causal efficacy of pattern recognition in evolutionary and cultural 
history on the one hand, and his eternalist and compositional atomist approach to 
questions of metaphysics on the other. The question is whether without his metaphysical 
assumptions, his evolutionary story would invite a more temporal, emergentist—and 
arguably more naturalist—understanding of the causal fabric of the world. Thus, his own 
evolutionary theory might be used to reveal new options in the metaphysical possibility 
space, and thereby show us beyond the deadlocked dichotomy of classic determinism and 
indeterminism.
A. Dennett’s naturalism & critique of “the buck stops here” claims
Dennett is a vehement critic of libertarian free will positions, as these typically 
point to some arbitrary break in the causal chain. He does not exclude the possibility 
of indeterminate quantum events nor that some level of indeterminacy or randomized 
processes might be useful—and thus evolutionarily, culturally and individually selected 
for—but he argues that no actual indeterminacy is needed at any relevant level of 
description to explain action choice. In other words, Dennett argues that indeterminacy 
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can be seen as either an irrelevant feature of ultimate physics or as a tool within a 
determinist story. He is particularly suspicious of the notion of “agent causation,” and the 
idea of any agent-level claim of indeterminacy. He argues that such agent-as-unmoved-
mover, “Deus ex Machina,” “the buck stops here” claims neither make any scientific sense 
nor—as indeterminism is precisely uncontrolled—seem to give us the kind of “free 
will worth wanting” (Dennett 1984 & 2003). Dennett has similar objections to other 
“the buck stops here” claims, and e.g. in connection with his analysis of intentionality, 
he compares the idea of “unmoved mover” to “unmeant meaners” and irreducible 
“original intentionality” (Dennett 1989, 288). He sees such claims as a sort of unscientific 
mysticism or at least as arbitrary and empirically intractable. His project is to show that 
we can make sense of our experience of action control, lived possibility and responsibility 
without “magic feathers” just like he thinks that consciousness can be understood 
without reference to a “Cartesian theater“(Dennett 1991). 
In spite of his claims to the contrary, many in the conceptual landscape of the free 
will debate view Dennett’s claim that our free will is compatible with determinism 
as incoherent and eventually interpretable as an instance of hard determinism and 
in effect implying that we do not as a matter of fact have true free will.1 As we shall 
see, a central unsettled issue is the question of whether, and in which sense we are 
free to “do other wise.” Dennett says that even if we cannot do otherwise from some 
sort of metaphysical Gods-eyes perspective, we have real lived options from our own 
epistemically limited perspective. Critics suggest that this makes free will an illusion, but 
Dennett insists that free will depends not on metaphysics but on our lived choices. He 
argues that our ability to perceive and deliberate about competing action possibilities 
is integral to action, anticipation and control, and these abilities all depend on eons of 
gradual processes of biological and cultural selection and horizontal transmission. Thus, 
our processes of decision-making should neither be seen as illusionary nor as causally 
epiphenomenal according to Dennett, but rather as an integral part of the causal fabric 
of everything. Dennett even challenges the view that we should care if we could have 
really done otherwise under the particular cosmic microstructure. He argues that the 
presence or absence of metaphysical possibilities would be utterly inscrutable from our 
lived perspective, and therefore should not cause us any worries. “The kind of free will 
worth wanting” is not metaphysical but practical. The key is our biological, cultural 
1. See e.g. his recent review of Sam Harris’ book see here: http://www.naturalism.org/Dennett_reflections_
on_Harris%27s_Free_Will.pdf and for Harris’ reply: http ://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-
marionettes-lament.
Brincker
43
and political ability and freedom to act according to our own—equally biological and 
cultural—preferences. Dennett thus uses, the Gods-eye point of view to argue for the 
compatibility of determinism and free will, but challenges the psychological relevance—
not consistency—of the metaphysical view, which makes determinism inacceptable.
2. The gradual evolution of freedom
Before further discussing the metaphysical aspects of Dennett’s compatibilism, we 
need to look at Dennett’s empirical and evolutionary account of the historical complexity 
underlying processes of human action control. I think that the millennia-old free will 
debate is in dire need of some empirical details about how we actually do seem to choose 
and control our voluntary actions. Note though—Dennett is not simply interested 
in revealing the details of the evolutionary histories, but is also concerned with using 
these as evidence to show that the whole can come to be “freer than its parts”—and by 
implication that freedom could have emerged in a determinist world. 
It seems to stand to reason that nothing composed of such unfree 
parts could have any more freedom, that the whole cannot be freer 
than its parts, but this hunch, which is the very backbone of resistance 
to determinism, will turn out, on closer inspection, to be an illusion. 
(Dennett 2003, 61)
Though we might not agree on the nature of the “parts,” I share Dennett’s belief that 
freedom has and can evolve—and that in that sense that the whole can be freer than its 
precursors. I also agree with his critique of essentialist and unchanging categories. The 
world is filled with borderline cases of everything, and, as Dennett, I see this variance as 
a crucial feature of our world rather than something that needs to be explained away.
A. Historical precursors and relational categorizations 
In Freedom Evolves Dennett discusses the chicken-egg paradox of the “first 
mammal” and the idea that—even though the parent of a mammal must per definition 
be a mammal—going back in evolutionary time, at some point our ‘parents’ were not 
mammals. Does that undermine the fact that we are mammals? He writes:
What should we do? We should quell our desire to draw lines. We 
don’t need to draw lines. We can live with the quite unchocking and 
unmysterious fact that, you see, there were all these gradual changes 
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that accumulated over many millions of years and eventually produced 
undeniable mammals. (Dennett 2003, 127)
Note Dennett’s pragmatic terminology: We “can live with” gradual changes and yet 
at some point the category is “undeniable.” The category, thus, emerges gradually and its 
eventual factuality is based in the relational response—not an essentialism of inherently 
necessary and sufficient properties. Dennett’s advice to us is to “quell our desire to 
draw lines.” I agree. Drawing neat lines is a powerful epistemological activity that often 
yields problematic metaphysical inferences. However, I shall suggest that ‘line-drawing’ 
i.e. discrimination and discernability, might be the engine of causality and change. As 
we shall see, I am concerned that Dennett’s own “intuition pumps”—by insisting on 
atomistic/digital (all-nothing) and compositional (part-whole) building blocs at the 
lowest level of reality—might lose the baby with the bath water. That is, he might forget 
his own insight that category borders typically are products of line-drawing activities, 
which themselves have to be explained. More on that later, but his critique of essentialist 
and unchanging all-or-none categories is well taken.
B. The evolution of normative entities and interests
Dennett’s project is to show that freedom can evolve—and not freedom in some 
sense of random undetermined action—but rather freedom as the ability to act according 
to ones interests and preferences. But what are interests and what does it mean to say 
someone has interests? Immediately we have opened two core cans of worms: 1) the 
issue of normativity/teleology and 2) the issue of what it means to be a self. Here again, 
we see Dennett’s anti-essentialism and his historical approach. The precursors for what 
Dennett purposively anthropomorphically calls “interests” did not evolve over night but 
slowly emerge through complex processes. He writes: 
The day the universe contained entities that could take some 
rudimentary steps towards defending their own interests was the 
day interests were born. The very tendencies of these organisms to 
preserve this or that (their varieties of homeostasis) helped sharpen the 
definition of their interests. Only certain sorts of homeostasis tended 
to be self-preserving in the long run; those kinds were replicated hence 
persisted, and hence gave further definition to the crude primordial 
“interest” in self-preservation and self-replication. (Dennett 1984, 22)
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Like in the question of the primordial mammal, we see how Dennett wants to give 
a gradual multipronged story of a complex generative dynamic process of evolution. The 
circularity and self-referential nature of the explanation is also apparent: What does it 
mean to be a rudimentary self? To be an entity that takes steps towards self-preservation 
and self-replication. What does it mean to have rudimentary interests? To be an entity 
that acts to protect (preserve and replicate) those interests. What breaks the unfruitful 
circularity of teleological explanation is its fruitfulness: I.e. the hindsight of preservation 
and replication. Judged from the present, we can look back and reify gradual “interests” 
and “selves” as precursors just like we can indentify non-mammalian mammalian 
ancestors. Note however, the different meanings of self-preservation given the inclusion 
or exclusion of self-replication. What is it that “persists” and that is preserved? In the 
case of a single organism, it is the survival of the organism and in the case of persistence 
through replication, it is the persistence of the organization and historical line of this 
organization through it’s expression in future individual organisms. Is it a bit more 
of a stretch to talk about replication-based persistence in terms of interest and self-
preservation? Dennett does not seem to think so, as he is rather comfortable with what 
he calls the “gene-eye-perspective” (and later “meme-eye-perspective”). As a matter of 
fact, he often takes this non-phenotypical “perspective” at sub-personal levels. But what 
would it mean to say that genes are selves with interests? Dennett himself points out the 
difference between us having interest in, and taking steps towards, preserving say a rock 
formation and the notion that this formation had interests of its own (1984, 22). Thus, 
doesn’t it even go against Dennett’s own stated definition to think of genes as carriers 
of interests, as genes are non-autonomous and thus incapable of taking any, even ever so 
rudimentary, “steps towards defending their own interests”? 
Dennett is well aware that a ‘naked gene’ is not an agent—not even in the primitive 
precursor sense. This is also clear in his discussion of memes. Dennett follows Dawkins 
and draws an analogy between biological genes and cultural “memes” as replicating 
recipes for behavior—or as he writes “a meme is an information-packet with attitude.” 
Language structures are examples of memes, and speech thus a ‘memetically’-based 
human cultural activity, transferred between people and generations. But like the “naked 
genes” of viroids, Dennett stresses that they depended on the human organism to be 
“expressed.”
Memes depend on human brains as their nesting places: human kidneys 
or lungs wouldn’t do as alternative sites, because memes depend on the 
thinking powers of their hosts. Being involved in thinking is a memes 
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics
46
way of being put through the paces and tested by natural selection, 
just as getting one’s protein recipe followed and getting the result out 
in the world is a gene’s way of being tested. If memes are tools for 
thinking (and many of the best of them are just that), they still have 
to be wielded for their phenotypic effects to show up. You still have to 
think. (Dennett 2003, 186)
As we see in this passage, Dennett stresses the dependency of meme and genes 
on organisms for their phenotypical expression and thus evolutionary “selection,” and 
further he highlights their nature as “tools.” But he simultaneously takes what he calls 
the “gene-eye” and “meme-eye perspective” by writing “getting one’s recipe followed.” 
One might here want to ask what these purposively anthropomorphic “intuition pumps” 
are doing for Dennett’s argument. Firstly, it seems that he wants to use these analogies 
to problematize the uniqueness of the human agentic perspective. He wants to give a 
story of gradual evolution of capacities rather than a radical all-or-none appearance of 
the human intellect. This part of the project I fully support. However, the question is 
if Dennett is so focused on the notion of “replication” that he downplays the dynamic 
processes of the autonomous “self” that is to be preserved or perhaps replicated? Dennett 
is perhaps using the gene-eye point of view as a way to resisting what he sees as mythical 
and Cartesian notions of a too substantial personal level self. The gene and the meme are 
“entities” that can be studied, and might be seen as the “things” that are being replicated. 
Dennett might use these as fix-points in his attempt to show that personal level 
teleology, preference and selection has biological precursors, and that “the freedom of 
the whole can be freer than the parts.” In other words, he appears to be using the “gene-
eye perspective” to imply that the world, minds and actions can be understood via a 
sort of atomistic compositionality. Ironically, I shall argue Dennett’s seeking of anchoring 
“things” and “parts” brings in a new set of “unmoved movers” and might obscure rather 
than help our understanding of emergent “selves,” autonomy, teleology and subjectivity. 
But to make this point, we need to look deeper into the evolutionary story.
C. Horizontal transmission & emergence of Bastardized ‘inners’ 
In Dennett’s attempt to give a bottom-up story, he does not just look at the last 
efficient cause of an action but seeks to understand freedom through the messy web 
of actual causal histories. A part of this deep history are the big leaps of evolution 
through horizontal integrations of different lineages, of “self” and parasitic “non-self” 
entities. Dennett here again draws parallels between biological and cultural horizontal 
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integrations.2 I share Dennett’s view that there is a continuity between the biological 
and cultural domain, and further that the details of the various layerings via horizontal 
integration are crucial to the multiplicity of timescales of regulation and control of 
multicellular organisms. I shall focus on his analysis of how the evolution of eukaryotic 
cells though the invasion and survival of one prokaryotic cell inside of another have 
allowed for new orders of complexity (2003, 144–146). This evolutionary history 
of layering is worth dwelling on as it might help us understand some basic dynamic 
characteristics of self-regulating organisms. One such question that Dennett discusses is 
how prokaryotic cells somehow already came with much more complex gene-regulation 
processes than they needed. He writes:
Fancier eukaryotic cells, however, to say nothing of us multicellular 
types composed of these more complex building blocks, need a mind-
boggling elaborate system of intermediate steps, checks and balances, 
so that genes can be turned on and off at appropriate times by the 
indirect effects of other gene products and so forth. For some time 
biologists had a classic chicken-and-egg puzzle to contend with: How 
did this elaborate gene-regulation machinery evolve? Multi-cellular life 
couldn’t even begin to evolve until most of this expensive machinery 
was in place, but it apparently isn’t required for prokaryotic life. 
(Dennett 2003, 146)
In other words, how could these much needed cellular control mechanisms be in 
place prior to the first eukaryotic pre-cursor cells? Such control mechanisms, balancing 
and adaptively applying tools given changing circumstances, allow primitive multi-
cellular organisms some level of autonomy and ability to have responses selected from 
various repertoires. Thus, their evolution might give us an important clue also to the 
understanding of our human-level abilities of action control. Dennett explains the 
emergence of this sort of cellular complexity in prokaryotic cells as follows: 
The answer that is now emerging is that it was paid for by a civil 
war that raged for roughly a billion years of early prokaryotic life. It 
was an arms race within the genome, with good citizen genes doing 
battle with those transposons – free loaders who copied themselves 
repeatedly in the genome without providing any benefit to the whole 
2. He writes e.g. “Horizontal transmission of design, of information that can be put to good uses, is a key 
feature of human culture, and undoubtedly the secret to our success as a species” (Dennett 2003, 145). 
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organism. This created lots of measures and countermeasures, such as 
silencing mechanisms and isolation-defeating mechanisms. (Dennett 
2003, 146)
This is indeed an interesting history to understand. Note the idea that the large 
jumps in evolutionary novelty became possible due to active processes of stabilizing the 
cells in the face of inner turmoil at an earlier stage. Further note, that when brought 
under control this intruder-created nuisance produced new potential capacities, which 
would then later be exploited to the organism’s advantage in entirely new contexts. 
A case of what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger—here in the specific sense of 
having expanded the repertoire of the ‘self’—and thus, response possibilities. Such 
inner complexity is expensive as Dennett says, but also in a broader sense opens you 
up to new kinds of vulnerabilities. I therefore like to call these events “bastardizations,” 
implying at once the multiple origins, otherness, and the always-looming possibility of 
indigestion, exclusion, isolation, general friction and precarious reception. But it also 
implies transformation, creative novelty and the birth of a truly new and unique self, the 
main challenge to whom comes from the quest of social recognition i.e. fitting existing 
categories. It is thus always a fragile balance of how much can be metabolized without 
collapsing the autonomy organism.3 Ironically, our subjectivity and great evolutionary 
assent to freedom has come through a series of debasing and tumultuous internalizations 
of others.4 But this is of course me projecting my interpretation onto Dennett, as his 
metaphors are generally more about wars, infections and peaceful co-existence than 
about illegitimate children and the precariousness of subjectivity. He writes: 
The eukaryotic revolution draws attention to the fact that even 
in biological evolution, which Darwin aptly called “descent with 
3. One might also suggest that the emergence of inner turmoil in moving organisms might have presented a 
puzzle of how to create coherence and negotiate the now necessary frame-shifts between inner and outer 
concerns. A puzzle to which conscious feelings and perceptions might have been an evolutionary solution. 
4. We are at present exposed to a radical cultural horizontal transmission through the technological 
inundation of information and surveillance. These things give us powerful new action repertoires and reach 
but also transform us—and our worlds—at runaway speeds. The borders of ‘selves’ and ‘societies’ are 
changing in ways that have significant effects on our autonomy, and if we don’t evolve new ‘membranes’ 
to help us control, regulate and hide our inner multiplicities, then we might very well end up adapting 
by moving the prime locus of autonomy to a societal level. In other words, we are in a period of 
externalization of our inners, which as we shall see might represent a loss of freedom in the sense of a loss 
of the ability to hide. 
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modification,” there is plenty of room for horizontal transmission 
of design. The prokaryotic hosts who were first “infected” by their 
symbiotic visitors got a huge gift of competence designed elsewhere. 
That is, they didn’t get all their competence by vertical descent from 
their ancestors via their parent and grandparents and so forth. They 
didn’t get all their competence from their genes, in other words. They 
did however pass on this gift to all their offspring and grand-off spring 
through their genes, since the genes of the invaders came to share 
the fate of the nuclear genes of their hosts, traveling side by side into 
the next generation, which was infected at birth, one might say, with 
its own complement of symbionts. The clear trace of this dual path 
is still highly salient today, in all multicellular creatures, including us. 
Mitochondria, the tiny organelles that transform energy in each of our 
cells, are the descendents of such symbiont invaders, and have their 
own DNA. Your mitochondrial DNA, which you get only from your 
mother, exists in each of your cells, alongside your nuclear DNA – your 
genome. (Dennett 2003, 145)
Given this passage, the crucial question is when something becomes part of “me.” 
Dennett’s terminology here suggests that ‘I’ am my genetic code but that ‘I’ depend on 
these ancient invaders, which are replicated in my offspring by an “infection at birth” 
but stay forever foreigners traveling “side by side” as their DNA has never merged with 
mine. But isn’t an alternative interpretation of the same biology, that I exist as a genetic 
multiplicity, that my genomes are a combination of both the mitochondrial and the 
nuclear DNA? After all, even the nuclear DNA is a bastardization as mentioned above. 
Interestingly Dennett leaves out the story of what one might consider life’s ‘original 
bastardization’. One candidate could here be the first trapping of RNA (possibly itself 
imported via meteorites from Mars5) in primitive lipid vesicles, and thus perhaps a 
primordial self of self-replicating life. However, the question is if Dennett would be more 
prone to think of the earlier RNA duplications as already self-replicating. The difference 
is that only with the event of the proto-membrane can we talk about some sort of inner 
environment, and also of clear processes of self-maintenance and autopoesis. I shall not 
suggest that we can discern a primordial mammal or a truly original bastardization of life, 
but merely highlight that Dennett’s evolutionary accounts have a tendency to downplay 
5. See Grossman & Webb (2013).
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or sideline the dynamics of boundaries and habitats in the evolution of self-replicating 
individuals. He does in the quote above talk about the necessity of the wider “molecular 
machinery,” in bringing about the phenotype. But yet he talks as if the gene/meme is the 
individual or the ‘entity’ that is being (self)-replicated, and thus, as somehow the locus 
of “interests” and somehow a “self.” In brief, he spends a lot of time on genes and memes 
as recipes for self-replication, but comparatively little on their contexts. References to 
membranes, time and autopoesis are suspiciously missing from the index of his books—
as if he tells the story of the chicken but forgets to mention the egg. 
These terminological choices are of some consequence when considering the issue of 
what it means to be an agentive self— and whether the DNA is more important than the 
boundary that actively establishes and maintains a difference between “self” and “other” 
not by any inherent pre-given essence or difference but via on-going dynamic and non-
instantaneous interchanges. With the gene as the locus of the proto-self self-replication, 
Dennett avails himself of a relative temporal stability and passive self-containment. If 
we on the other hand focus to the entire cell or organism we can see that its stability, 
maintenance and autonomy is a precarious, active and contextual process in constant 
flux.
D. The spatio-temporal agent is the loop
As we have seen already, Dennett wants to dispel the need for extra supernatural 
“magic feathers.” He sees our abilities to recognize, anticipate and select actions as tools 
to maintain some preferred homeostasis or outcomes that we have developed and 
gradually selectively shaped through both evolutionary time and though our cultural 
environments. Based on analyses like the above one of the eukaryotic revolution, Dennett 
defends the idea that our human-level freedom can be understood analogously, as much 
fancier ways of using meme invader and “trapping reasons,” for purposes of intricate 
forms of anticipation and avoidance. He argues that all this is possible to understand 
without any super-natural assumptions or breaks in the causal fabric of reality; “the 
whole can be freer than its parts,” and we might add the present more free than it’s past: 
Events in the distant past were indeed not “up to me,” but my choice 
now to Go or Stay is up to me because its “parents” – some events in 
the recent past, such as the choices I have recently made – were up to 
me (because their “parents” were up to me), and so on, not to infinity, 
but far enough back to give my self enough spread in space and time so 
that there is a me for my decisions to be up to! The reality of the moral 
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me is no more put in doubt by the incompatibilist argument than is the 
reality of mammals. (Dennett 2003, 135–136)
We see here, the analogy between this notion of autonomy of something being 
“up to me” and Dennett’s primordial mammal argument. The purpose of the analogy 
might be to pump the intuition that autonomy too is not only a category with degrees—
an intuition I share—but also that it is a historical lineage category. I also agree that 
autonomy is historical, but like we saw in the discussion of the gene eye-perspective, I 
think we are genetic bastards and that autonomy is continuously re-negotiated in the 
present. Thus, I am hesitant to endorse the idea that whether my current action is up 
to me depends that strongly on whether its precursors has the proper kind of history.6 
However, Dennett also adds that the question of whether we see something as being 
up to us depends on whether we go “far enough back to give my self enough spread in 
space and time so that there is a me for my decisions to be up to!” This point about how 
big or small a perspective we take on our selves is really fascinating and something that 
Dennett returns to multiple times in discussing moral responsibility. 
The general idea of a both spatially and temporally extended self also plays a key role 
in Dennett’s argument against the incompatibilists, as it is via this notion that we become 
the authors of our actions and that we play a consequential causal role in the world. 
Dennett argues that the inference, that our heart-wrenching deliberations, thoughts and 
actions would be obsolete in a determinist world, comes from the idea of an extensionless 
and non-material self. In accordance with his critique of the Cartesian theater, Dennett 
is similarly critical of the idea of some sort of localizable atomistic conscious self, which 
can be neatly contrasted with the non-self aspects of our physiology. Hence, in his 
discussion of Libet’s findings and assumptions about the causal role of the conscious self 
he concludes: “What Libet discovered was not that consciousness lags ominously behind 
unconscious decision, but that conscious decision-making takes time” (2003, 239).7 And 
a bit further down he writes: 
When we remove the Cartesian bottleneck, and with it the 
commitment to the ideal of the mythic time t, the instant when the 
conscious decision happens, Libet’s discovery of a 100-millisecond veto 
6. Note the similarity to Millikan’s teleosemantics and historical notion of “proper function”—and perhaps 
the challenges her account faces due to its disregard for the influence of synchronic organization. (Millikan 
1989). 
7. Gallagher (2006) has made similar criticisms of the implausible temporal assumptions of the Libet studies.
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window evaporates. Then you can see that our free will, like all our 
other mental powers, has to be smeared out over time, not measured 
at instants. (Dennett 2003, 239)
I couldn’t agree more, both with the claim that the notion of a “time t” for action 
is a myth, and the claim that free will has to be smeared out over time. In the further 
explanation, we can really see the central role the extended self plays in Dennett’s 
compatibility theory both our freedom and responsibility. He writes: 
Once you distribute the homunculus (in this case, decision making, 
clock watching, and decision-simultaneity-judging) in both time and 
space in the brain, you have to distribute the moral agency around 
as well. You are not out of the loop; you are the loop. You are large. 
You are not an expansionless point. What you do and what you are 
incorporates all these things that happen and is not something separate 
from them” (Dennett 2003, 241–242)
This is an extremely important idea—if we are not Cartesian dualists or in other 
ways thinking of free will as external to the material world and the biological body, then, 
in so far as “we” exist, it is natural to think of our deliberations and decision-making as 
not only being in the causal loop but being the loop. It is thus by way of this idea that 
Dennett claims that his account of voluntary action indeed makes actions, not only up 
to us, but causally dependent on us. Further, he writes, “you have to spread the moral 
agency around as well.” Thus, the degree to which we see ourselves as large or small 
corresponds to our respective internalization and externalization of the responsibility. His 
point seems to be mainly a question of perspective: if we on the one hand see ourselves 
from the outside we tend to look at the multitudes of “external” causes of our action. But 
if on the other hand we spread ourselves out, then those same causes seem to “internal” 
to ourselves and they would thus be our responsibility. The question is whether this leads 
to an unnecessary moral relativism. Are all perspectives equally morally valid? In other 
words, does Dennett in his eagerness to avoid the homunculus again forget about the 
semi-permeable membranes and the phenotypes selection works on?
E. Appearance and reality—the causal effects of hiding and revealing 
I want now to highlight another dynamic—and possibly constitutive—aspect of 
autonomic evolved selves. Namely, the ability to selectively hide and reveal aspects of 
both our inner and outer worlds and thus purposively control interactions. Dennett 
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himself talks about intentional deception as an important mental capacity as well as of 
course our ability to track and gage when we and others are being deceived. He proposes 
that the difference between appearance and reality is “fatal” to all organisms, but only 
we humans have the ability to reflect on and deliberately “bridge the gap.”8 Dennett is 
probably right that our ability to voluntarily take steps to make reality appear and not 
appear sets us apart. However, he is also well aware that many unconscious steps towards 
controlling the gap between appearance and reality are at the core of the evolution of 
life. He writes e.g.: “Mother nature abides by the “Need to Know” principle”(1984, 24). 
Thus the issue is not simply the human ability to deliberately “bridge” —i.e. eradicate—
the gap but rather to purposively control and exploit the gap.9 
Further, I would argue that one could see this control as a core ingredient in the 
emergence of teleological evaluative selves and thus as a key to any evolutionary story 
of the freedom of action. The question is if it isn’t the “hiding” of the genetic material 
behind a membrane that allows for steps towards self-preservation? If the world simply 
triggers the replication is it self-replication? Independently of how one decides to 
categorize the primordial mammal or the beginning of self-replicating life, I think one 
gets the picture wrong if evolving processes of control are not seen as dependent on and 
contributive to abilities of hiding and revealing.
Dennett’s story of horizontal transmission in both biology and culture is fascinating 
to see against this background—as we then see that the self-other dynamic is one of 
control. What is “me” is not my just my nuclear genome and it is not the conglomerate of 
my human stem-line cells with both mitochondrial and nuclear DNA, but rather a much 
more genetically and culturally messy—and constantly changing—set of processes. Are 
the symbiotic microbes of my digestive system part of me? Is my foot? Is my language? 
8. “The difference between how things really are is just as fatal as a gap for them as it can be for us, but they 
are largely oblivious to it. The recognition of the difference between appearance and reality is a human 
discovery. A few other species—some primates, some cetaceans, maybe even some birds—show signs of 
appreciating the phenomenon of “false belief”—getting it wrong. They exhibit sensitivity to the errors 
of others, and perhaps even some sensitivity to their own errors as errors, but they lack the capacity for 
the reflection required to dwell on this possibility, and so they cannot use this sensitivity in the deliberate 
design of repairs or improvements of their seeking gear and hiding gear. That sort of bridging of the gap 
between appearance and reality is a wrinkle that we human beings alone have mastered” (Dennett 2003, 
165). Note that Dennett’s thoughts on human and primate abilities to appreciate false belief have lead to a 
whole industry of test paradigms. See also Brincker (2014) for a recent theory of the development of “false 
belief” implicit and explicit performance in humans.
9. See also Dennett points about self-deception (1984, 48). 
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Are my contacts? The point is not to answer these questions in the abstract. The point 
is that our bodily reactions, engagements and actions shape the answers as they answer. 
I am always a self—or rather selves—in the making. My complexities and messy causal 
histories determine me and yet scaffold my freedom.
F. Options & evitability
Dennett thus, builds forward to his notion of freedom as the ability to recognize, 
anticipate outcomes and actually choose what you prefer—given your also evolved 
preferences. 
This process, he argues, can be seen as entirely deterministic: You recognize what he 
calls “a “special interest opportunity” and given your anticipation of outcome compared 
to your preferences you select either to act towards or to avoid. He writes
So a real opportunity is an occasion where a self-controller “faces”—is 
informed about—a situation in which the outcome of its subsequent 
“deliberation” will be a decisive (as we say) factor. In such a situation 
more than one alternative is “possible” so far as the agent or self-
controller is concerned; that is, the critical nexus passes through its 
deliberation. (Dennett 1984, 118)
Thus, Dennett takes possibilities for action to be recognized opportunities that 
one could either decide to pursue or not. Accordingly, he argues that determinism does 
NOT, as most claim, make actions “inevitable.” Rather, we have evolved—possibly in a 
determinist fashion—to be very fancy evators or avoiders. 
Both hard determinists and Libertarians here typically object and say that this is not 
true “evitability” as you “could not have done otherwise”! Dennett says no not in these 
exact circumstances, given these precise preferences, perceptions and anticipations this 
precise action was selected by your “will” if you want. Had it been a different—even 
ever a so slightly different—universe you could have done otherwise. And Dennett says 
that we always sneak in such different circumstances when we say we could have acted 
differently. Thus e.g. yes had I wanted to I could have picked a different action…but 
his point is that this different volition would exactly be a product of a different causal 
world—not this world. 
I will in the following sections analyze Dennett’s metaphysical arguments and 
the intuition pumps he uses to defend this idea that other outcomes could only come 
about in other possible worlds. A closer look seems to reveal a tension within Dennett’s 
compatibilism. As we have seen in his evolutionary story he points to 1) the historicity 
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and precursors of categorizations, and the causal efficacy of 2) our “loop” of perspectival 
epistemic limitations, spread-out layered selves and 3) of the gap between appearance 
and reality. Yet, he assumes a metaphysical base level of non-perspectival causality where 
appearance and reality always neatly coincides. I shall suggest that he overlooks a set 
of metaphysically possible worlds in which all causal interactions are limited and there 
thus—even “under the aspect of eternity”—is no base-level, but always precursors and 
“back stages” to use Dennett’s own term. But I get ahead of myself.
3. Dennett’s metaphysical view from eternity
Dennett argues that from our lived perspective we have multiple possibilities for 
action, but these are not possibilities to actually change the course of the world. Quoting 
from Elbow Room: 
But if we want to change the course of history we are in for a big 
disappointment. For no one can change the course of history – for 
reasons that have nothing to do with determinism. At the beginning of 
the chapter we imagined all of space and time, past, present and future 
laid out before us (“sub specie aeternitatis” in philosophical parlance: 
under the aspect of eternity). If the scene we thereby imagine is 
supposed to be the actual course of history through eternity, then – 
look, and see – the image has no branchings. Only one actual thing 
happened whether or not what happens is determined to happen, 
so the part of our image we label “Future” consists of the events that 
actually happen – happen to happen – in the fullness of time. (Dennett 
1984, 124)
Dennett is right that branches are hard to make sense of—as Bergson (1889) pointed 
out their imagery assumes the hindsight of all the alternative actions as actually having 
been carried out. However, many would say that the kind of free will worth wanting 
is precisely one whereby my actions can change or add to the course of world history. 
Dennett would likely respond that my actions do participate in the causal history of the 
world and thus influence it, but “under the aspect of eternity” I have changed nothing. I 
argue that this view from eternity is a fancy vending machine.
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A. The metaphysical stance
I have admittedly always been struck by the oddness of the age-old “metaphysical 
stance,” above conceived of as “imagining all of space and time” “laid out before us.” It 
is supposed to be the ultimate exercise of objectivity of abstracting away our situated 
perspective—and yet it seems impossible to formulate this metaphysical notion in 
abstraction from some sort of perceiver or subjective point of view. This feature of an 
entirely external non-specified perceiver is clearly seen in the expression, “the view from 
nowhere” and the “God’s-eye perspective”—or here as Dennett writes “under the aspect 
of eternity.” The purpose of the non-specificity of the perceiver is presumably that any 
specification would impose a limitation to the view and thus prevent the access to the 
totality of being, the “Ding an sich.” It is thus a paradoxical mind-bending activity of 
imaging the mind-independent world: the appearance of reality independently of 
appearance, i.e. the ultimate bridging of the gap between appearance and reality.10 
But what could it mean to “see” (not to mention smell), the entire “actual course of 
history”? As Akins (1996) reminds us, our senses are narcissistic, and it seems that the 
metaphysical stance invites us to abstract from any kind of categorization, recognition or 
reification process that we would rely on in actuality. This “metaphysical stance” exercise 
is at least as old as the ancient Greeks and likely as old as metaphysical thinking, and is 
constantly appealed to in the free will debate as a way of exposing the inconsistency of a 
determinism and the notion of free will as the ability to do otherwise or “agent causality.” 
It should be stressed that it is a pivotal part of Dennett’s own compatibilist argument 
that we can never actually reach a God’s eye point of view—and that this epistemological 
limitation is precisely what makes our action-opportunities real from our perspective. 
Laplace’s omniscient intellect is impossible in reality and this makes a difference to 
Dennett, as it guarantees the practical unpredictability of the world. Even if the world 
is entirely determinist, as long as it is inscrutably so and forever hidden, it is irrelevant to 
our freedom. 
Yet, Dennett appeals to this admittedly impossible vantage point to deny the very 
possibility of metaphysical possibility. So, we need to understand how this image is doing 
10. See also Putnam’s critique of what he calls the “externalist view.” He argues that there cannot be “exactly 
one true and complete description of the ‘the way the world is’…there can be no God’s eye view of reality” 
and writes further: “What we have here is the demise of a theory that lasted for over two thousand years. 
That it persisted so long and in so many forms in spite of the internal contradictions and obscurities which 
were present from the beginning testifies to the naturalness and the strength of the desire for a God’s 
eye view”(Putnam 1981, 74). See also Hornsby on the nomological character of causality (Hornsby 1997, 
78–80).
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work in his argument. I will therefore look closely at his metaphysical images and models, 
which are used 1) to evoke the idea that the future is closed, that we can change nothing 
and 2) to explain the determinism, which he claims to compatible be with lived freedom. 
B. Laplace’s infinite intellect 
Before we turn to Dennett’s use of the metaphysical stance, I want to say a 
bit about Laplace’s famous “metaphysical stance” image of determinism. He writes: “We 
may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its 
future.” And to explain this determinist causation from “the present state” to the “it’s 
future,” he continues: 
An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that 
set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is 
composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data 
to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the 
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such 
an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past 
would be present before its eyes. (Laplace 1814)
Thus, the way Laplace conceives or “sees” the past as fixing the present and future is 
through an exhaustive knowledge of a time-slice of a frozen universe set in predictable 
motion. Note that the role of the “intellect” is as the measuring stick, the background (or 
foreground) in relation to which—before which—the world is arrested and everything is 
reified. In other words, the picture does not work without its implication of an intellect 
or some kind of “reifyer” which—as any measuring stick—itself is external to the 
universe, not included, not itself “given.” It is the full transparency (appearance=reality) 
of everything for the intellect that allows for the exhaustiveness of the knowledge and 
thus predictive completeness. With limited and perspectival transparency uncertainty 
would not be eradicated and the world would appear only partially and thus not be 
transparently “present” as a totality. Interestingly, Laplace’s image imposes a temporal 
limitation to the otherwise vast intellect. The intellect need not know everything “under 
the aspect of eternity” but only know everything at “a certain moment,” and then given 
the deterministic analysis of forces and motions the temporal transparency appears: 
everything becomes “present before its eyes.” 
The notion of time slices, moments, instants, as we shall see in Dennett’s analysis, 
seem to be a fixture of determinism formulations. Laplace takes the instantaneous 
transparency of everything for granted. But it is an open question if all causalities 
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and regularities of “the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom” 
could possibly be arrested and “revealed”—even to an infinite intelligence—on one 
homogeneous and near instantaneous temporal scale. This is important, as the purpose 
of image is to argue that the actual world we live in—behind the appearances—
is fully determined and timeless in the sense that it could have been predicted and 
instantaneously “present before” us if we knew the initial conditions of the universe.
C. The view from eternity & the denial of possibilities
As we have seen, Dennett proposes a historical, empirically-based theory of how our 
ability of voluntary action has evolved and how it can be understood as arising within 
a causal understanding of nature. Free will, he argues, does not break the causal web 
as most have assumed, but rather acts within it. However, note that his metaphysical 
view of the world does not depend on determinism. He writes: “The image we should 
have when we imagine this universe to be nondeterministic ought to be indistinguishable 
from the image we imagine when we conjure up a deterministic universe through time” 
(Dennett 1984, 124). How so? The key to Dennett’s suggestion, that the future’s 
closedness does not depend on determinism, seems to lie in his eternalist “bloc universe” 
view. Though a defender of determinism as compatible with free will, he is agnostic 
about whether the world from an inaccessible point of view unfolds in a determined or 
indetermined fashion. Thus, the reason why he sees the metaphysical stance as excluding 
changes to the course of history is not that we are caught in a determinist causal web, in 
which all actions in theory could have been predicted from initial conditions as Laplace’s 
famous thought experiment would have it. He continues: 
If the past is unchangeable, the future is unavoidable – on anyone’s 
account. The future consists, timelessly, of the sequence of events that 
will happen, whether determined to happen or not, and it makes no 
more sense to speak of avoiding those events as it does to speak of 
avoiding the events that have already happened. (Dennett 1984, 124)
Under the eternalist view, there is no passage of time, just a totality of moments 
or temporal extension. Time is a dimension like space, and therefore the past and future 
are equally fixed and “timelessly” existing. Dennett asks us to “look” at the totality of 
time: “past, present and future laid out before us.” Note that Dennett here is assuming a 
different extent of transparency (appearance=reality) than Laplace did. He immediately 
jumps to the view from eternity, which Laplace only gained through the application 
of deterministic analysis. From that vantage point, causes and laws are irrelevant and 
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the indeterminist and the determinist universe are equally transparent. So, what has 
Dennett shown with his eternalist view? That the passage of time changes nothing? 
That the “present” holds no possibilities, nothing more than what “will happen”? It seems 
to me though, that these conclusions are assumed in the formulation of the timeless 
eternalist picture. In other words, isn’t the claim that there could be local possibilities, 
which can cease to exist, precisely denying that one can see everything from nowhere, 
from eternity, from God’s house, you name it? If one assumes that everything is “seen” 
from this metaphysical stance then one limits the possible metaphysical options 
accordingly. Only worlds of full eternalist transparency are possible. The transparent 
moments could be “sequenced” in an either determinist or indeterminist fashion, but 
there shall be nothing hidden, no time, no change of what has already been assumed. 
Any view that takes time—and emergence for that matter—to be real is excluded as 
impossible. Thus, Dennett like Laplace seems to use his metaphysical stance to assume 
what he wants to conclude. He assumes that reality across eternity could be given fully 
transparent and coherent. Hence, he claims, there were never any other possibilities.11 
In “the fullness of time” he writes above, only the actual history will exist. That might 
be so, but isn’t it at least possible that even God only sees a partial truth? Could one 
imagine that some possibilities—or precursors—“existed” (in a non-reified sense), but 
never had any consequence12 and thus are inscrutable, hidden even from the “fullness of 
time” perspective? This is a hard idea to entertain because we can never describe any such 
possibility without reifying and recognizing it, and thus installing it forever in the causal 
web. We might not therefore be able to conceive of this metaphysical idea from the 
metaphysical stance, but the classic formulation of the paradoxical stance has problems 
of its own and perhaps shouldn’t be our measure of the possible.
D. Discrete and compositional determinism 
Dennett does not just want to argue that only the actual course of history exists, 
he also wants to show that determinism is compatible with his notion of free will as 
evolving. Over the course of his books he presents different formulations of what 
11. Dennett’s position sounds and smells like a version of actualism, i.e. the position that only what is actual 
is possible. However, he vehemently argues that it is not—because he allows for lived and situated 
possibilities also interpreted in terms of capacities of objects. See (Dennett 1984, 144).
12. I shall not here be able to develop an emergentist or interactivist view of causality, but note that already 
Hume plays around with the idea that causing means producing, and that a cause can only be reified or 
understood through it effects, it is the “by which” (Hume 1750).
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determinism is and I shall look at a few of them. In Freedom Evolves he starts out his 
discussion with Inwagen’s definition that the claim of determinism is that “there is at 
any instant exactly one physically possible future” (Inwagen 1983, 3). He writes that this 
“not a particularly difficult idea.” I beg to differ. As discussed in relation to Laplace, it is 
not clear how we are to actually think of “instants” that somehow contains something 
that fixes “physical futures”? Again a crux of my worry has to do with the timelessness 
of the material universe assumed under classical determinism, and the notion of a 
universe “time slices,” “instants,” “time t” etc.13 We saw that Dennett himself talks 
about the notion of “time t” as a “mythical ideal” when it comes to the empirical study 
of the mind, however he seems perfectly content with it when defining determinism. 
The idea of an all-encompassing and extensionless time-slice of the arrested universe is 
in many descriptions of determinism operationalized as a “state description.” Dennett 
writes: “A universe is deterministic if there are transition rules (the laws of physics) that 
determine exactly which state description follows any particular state description. If there 
is any slack or uncertainty, the universe is indeterministic” (Dennett 2003, 28–9). But 
interestingly Dennett quickly gives up on this definition as a useful tool for his argument. 
He writes: “There are too many fudge factors in this simple vision as it stands: How exact 
must a state description be? Must we plot every sub-atomic particle, and just which 
properties of the particle need to be included in the description?” (Dennett 2003, 29). I 
agree! The classical definition might not be feasible due to the challenge of pinning down 
the ultimate reality—or its “rules.” Dennett of course sees this as merely a question of 
practical feasibility, and he then solves the issue by going a way from a material world 
model to a digital model without any “fudge.” He writes: 
We can anchor these slippery factors arbitrarily by adopting another 
simplifying idea, W.v.O. Quine’s proposal that we restrict our attention 
to simple imaginary universes, which he calls “Democritean” universes, 
in honor of Democritus, the most inventive of the ancient Greek 
atomist. A Democritean universe consists of some “atoms” moving 
about in “space.” That is all. The atoms in a Democritean universe are 
not modern atoms full of quantum complexities but truly a-tomic 
(unsplittable, unsliceable) atoms, tiny uniform points of matter with 
13. It is beyond the scope of this article to enter the deep debates within the philosophy of time, but I do 
want to motivate free will theorists to interrogate their typical treatment of the world as timeless. It is 
particularly ironic when the question at hand is how we as agent might effect change in the universe. For 
great discussion of the problems of the denial of temporality see Crome (2007) & Smolin (2013).
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no parts at all, rather like those postulated by Democritus. The space 
they inhabit must be made ultra simple, too, by digitizing it. (Dennett 
2003, 29)
What has been described here? Dennett suggests that these “unfudged” imaginary 
all-or-nothing, uniform, ahistorical unsliceable atoms are a kind of “matter.” But if so, in 
which sense? He also writes that they “move” in digitized space, but how so? Dennett 
has reduced the “universes” to sets of successive “states.” In the quest to “unfudge” he 
seems to have defined away materiality, temporality and change. But do we not precisely 
need the fudge to portray a material and temporally changing world—i.e. is he loosing 
the material world he seeks to model in these first simplifying moves?14 Dennett does not 
seem to think so. He uses this Quinean notion of Democritean universes to construct a 
“vast” but finite possibility space of “all possible worlds,” namely all possible combinations 
of state descriptions in the digitized space given a predefined finite number of successive 
“instants.” Pacing Borges, he calls this the Democritean Library. Each world represents 
one view from eternity, just simpler—and finite—as time and space are here explicitly 
discrete, and matter digitized. Given this finite Library of finite logically or “physically” 
possible and fully transparent universes, Dennett can now clarify Inwagen’s definition. 
Determinism holds in the subset of logically possible worlds in which: 
“There is at any instant exactly one physically possible future. To say 
that determinism is true is to say that our actual world is in a subset of 
worlds that have the following interesting property: There are no two 
worlds that start out exactly the same (if they start the same, they stay 
the same forever – they are not different worlds at all), and if any two 
worlds share any state description exactly, they share all subsequent 
state descriptions.” (Dennett 2003, 67)
Again, as we have already seen, the eternalist view does not pertain uniquely to 
determinist universes but relies simply on the fact that everything is fully transparent and 
scrutable in each possible world. The news is that a “set” based definition of determinism 
is now not based on fixed transition rules, but rather on the notion that we browse 
the Democritean library, and compare and contrast “worlds.” The very idea of a “world” 
14. This is by no means a new insight but a paradox, which has been known at least since Parmenides 
and Zeno, and Democritus atomism was a compositional attempt to reconcile timeless being with our 
experience of time and change. See Crome (2007) for a fascinating analysis of the classic paradoxes and the 
conclusion that making sense of time and change might involve going beyond discrete math. 
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depends on the discerning intellect in the metaphysical stance, but now we are also 
asked to make “sets” of “possible worlds.” This requires a meta-metaphysical stance, as 
I now need to step back from the individual world and imagine the whole vast Library 
of possible worlds to find out, which worlds have respectively overlapping and differing 
states. If two possible worlds after one overlap stay the same through eternity, then they 
are determinist worlds. With this definition the determinism—or indeterminism—of 
our actual world can be settled on the basis of sets of entirely discrete and unchanging 
digitized sequences, without any of “fudge” of describing or applying laws to create 
movement and change. In other words, the meta-metaphysical stance allows us to 
categorize across worlds and thus define determinism without ever introducing matter in 
lawful motion. With this toolbox Dennett’s challenge is just to show that life can evolve 
in such “worlds”, and this is where Conway’s game of life comes into the picture.
E. Conway’s game of life 
One of Dennett’s favorite models to show how complexity and avoidance can come 
from determinist underpinnings is Princeton Mathematician John Conway’s digital “game 
of life.”15 The game consists of 1) a very simple finite two-dimensional world—a grid, 
with cells capable of being ON or OFF and discrete temporal instances. 2) A set of initial 
conditions where some and not all cells are ON - to get the “physics” going and 3) a set of 
very simple timeless and universal rules, which Dennett calls the “life Physics”: 
Life physics : For each cell in the grid, count how many of its eight 
neighbors are on at the present instant. If the answer is exactly two, 
the cell stays in its present stage (ON or OFF) in the next instant. If 
the answer is exactly three, the cell is ON in the next instant whatever 
its current state. Under all other conditions the cell is OFF. (Dennett 
2003, 36)
How does the transformation take place? How are the rules followed? From the 
perspective of each of the finite number of cells—we get an “input” of 1) number of ON 
cell neighbors and 2) ON or OFF status - which is categorically adjusted according to the 
rules of the “life physics.” Note again that appearance and reality always neatly coincides. 
Dennett actually acknowledges this and writes “One of the delights of the Life world is 
that nothing is hidden in it; there is no backstage.” It is a neat world of zero ambiguity, 
15. See Gardner’s (1970) for the original description in Scientific American. 
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where nothing exists, which is not recognized and responsive to the “life physics” at each 
instant. 
Dennett, as mentioned, uses this simplified universe as an “intuition pump” for us 
to understand that life-like complexity can emerge from utterly deterministic rules. He 
points out that from an “intentional stance,” we can recognize rather interesting patterns 
when we look at the unfolding changes of the “life world” from various distances and 
tempos. And he sees these higher-level patterns as in a sense real. Here is a quote from 
his discussion of pattern recognition in the Intentional Stance: 
Is the pattern that enables you to make the prediction “real”? So long as 
it lasts it is…The pattern may owe its existence to the intentions (clear-
sighted or confused) of the machines designer, but its reality in any 
interesting sense – its longevity and robustness – is strictly independent 
of the historical facts about its origin. (Dennett 1987, 39)
The pattern is real and its reality is in its longevity and robustness. But what would 
that mean in the “Life world” as these patterns are indiscernable to the “life physics”? Is 
the reality in their availability to be recognized by us as external viewers? He writes:
Whether one can see the pattern is another matter…I claim that the 
intentional stance provides a vantage point for discerning similarly 
useful patterns. These patterns are objective – they are there to be 
detected – but from our point of view they are not out there entirely 
independently of us, since they are patterns composed partially of our 
own “subjective” reactions to what is out there; they are the patterns 
made to order for our narcissistic concerns (Akins 1986). (Dennett 
1987, 39)
Thus, pattern recognition is relational as it is “composed partially of our own 
“subjective” reactions.”16 The “interesting” patterns of the game of Life also clearly 
depend on us as viewers, the distance and speed by which we watch, as well as all the 
other recognition repertoires we bring with us (think Rorschach test). But is reification 
also relational at the “physical level”? It seems that the ON and OFF status of the cells 
must depend on their “recognition” as such, not by us but by the “life physics.” In this 
16. His description of the patterns and their objectivity and yet relational dependence can be seen as 
somewhat analogous to Gibson’s view of affordances as objective but yet relative to the perceiver in their 
reification. See e.g. Gibson (1977). 
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connection it is curious that another of Dennett’s favorite toy models is the “two-bitser”; 
a soda vending machine that recognizes and responds to certain coins and not others 
(Dennett 1987). Here he seems to propose, along the lines of Quinean inscrutability,17 
that if a two kinds of coins (“fake” and “real” quarters) cannot be discriminated, then 
there appears to be no further fact of the matter of which kind they are. The ultimate 
test is the actual interaction between coin and machine: if the soda comes out then it is 
a quarter. 
In the two-bitser-case the interactions depend on a wealth of material details and 
complexities of the coins and the machine—which go beyond the recognition itself. I.e. 
no coins are actually identical material tokens and yet treated as such from the limited 
(and limiting) “perspective” of the machine. The material opacity has been eradicated in 
the game of life, where there is “no back stage” for either grid, cells or physics that goes 
beyond the recognition itself. The “Life worlds” are fully transparent two-dimensional 
worlds. Appearance equals reality and every existent difference is recognized and 
responded to with transition rules by the “physics,” the omniscient Gods-eye-grid. 
Dennett introduces the ‘game of life’ to show that complexity can emerge from 
strict physical determinism. But as even the “physical level” is digital it is not much like 
a material world in any traditional sense. There are not any persisting atoms nor any 
other “matter”. Rather the cells go through instantaneous birth and annihilation without 
any component precursors or remains. Ex nihilo—in nihilo—like Leibnizian monads.18 
No continuous becoming and only something like instantaneous symbolic being. This 
digitalized all-or-nothing idea is necessary in Dennett’s (and Leibniz’) model to “unfudge” 
and stop the regress of further compositionality. 
The question that I would like to raise is whether it is plausible that the ultimate 
level of universe would have any of these “life world” features? Note all the “unmoved 
mover” and “unregulated regulator” aspects of the Game of life. Where do the eternal 
17. See e.g. Quine (1960).
18. Interestingly Leibniz monads are in many ways like digital pixels. See his monadology 1–6, in particular: 
“3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. 
These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of things. 4. Their dissolution, 
therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish 
through natural means. 5. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance 
might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition. 6. We may 
say then, that the existence of monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the monad can begin 
only through creation and end only through annihilation. Compounds, however, begin or end by parts” 
(Leibniz, [italics mine]).
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laws of physics come from? Where does the space grid come from, where do the pixels’ 
coloring come from or disappear too? How are “instants” aligned, i.e. how are we to 
understand simultaneity or the idea of the “state of the universe at time t”? Dennett is a 
devout naturalist but yet these assumptions instill a finite border beyond which the “why” 
question does not apply. Dennett could here remind us that this model is purposively 
“unfudged.” But as we have seen in our earlier analyses, it is not just Conway’s model that 
introduces “unexplained explainers”—all assumptions of this “no back stage” collapse 
of appearance-reality collapse do. In other words, all Dennett’s proposed metaphysical 
images do. 
Beyond the question of the plausibility of “the buck stops here” assumptions of the 
framework, there is Dennett’s question of whether the game of life could succeed in 
simulating evolution and freedom. In other words, returning to the issue of whether 
an unfudged model can show the complexity of life and pass the “Turing test” of life so 
to speak. Remember that in the two-dimensional discrete and determinist “Life worlds” 
all transitions are based on the “physical level” where appearance and reality never 
come apart. We can see the higher-level patterns, but the “life physics” cannot, and 
being external to the “Life world” our recognition is without consequence. In our lived 
world of epistemic agents and vending machines Dennett accepts the causal power of 
discrimination based on epistemic limitations. We are the loop. Dennett also insightfully 
proposes that whereas some interactions amplify variation, digitizing can be seen as a 
way of absorbing micro-variation. He writes: 
Surely, the result of a coin flip is the deterministic outcome of the total 
sum of forces acting one the coin…but this total sum has no predictable 
patterns in it. That is the point of a randomizing device like a coin flip, 
to make the result uncontrollable by making it sensitive to so many 
variables that no feasible, finite list of conditions can be singled out as 
the cause…It accomplishes just the opposite of digitizing in computers: 
Instead of absorbing all the micro-variation in the universe, it amplifies 
it… (Dennett 2003, 85 [italics mine])
This is an important point in regards to our metaphysical appearance and reality 
questions. Along these lines Conway’s Game of life, and other digitized representations, 
like the two-bitser can be seen as owing their discrete all-or-none outcomes to 
condensing variation absorbing processes. In the case of Dennett’s use of the Game of life 
as a metaphysical illustration, we are asked to disregard the physical computer, pretend 
there is no backstage, and limit our view to the “front stage” of the life world. We do 
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this by taking the deterministic laws, digitized “matter” and finite and discrete grids as 
“uncaused causes.” But given Dennett’s own analyses of relational categorization and 
pattern recognition would one not expect these digitized “Ex nihilo—in nihilo” creations 
and annihilations to precisely depend on a perspectival view? In other words, from the 
perspective of the two-bitser the quarter is either present or not. From the “grid-eye-
perspective” of the “Life world” a pixel is either on or off. But like Dennett writes here 
such “unfudging” is generally the product of interactions absorbing variations. From a 
different perspective one might be able to discriminate two coins, which the two-bitser’s 
recognition systems cannot, and thereby amplify consequences—e.g. by arresting people 
and so on. The point I am making is that each of Dennett’s models gain their discreteness 
via the introduction of an ultimate “uncategorized categorizer,” be it the God’s eye point 
of view or the “grids” of ideal physics, or a giant immaterial two-bitser, in brief, the 
supreme perspective, beyond which no other discriminations or reifications can be made. 
Further, in determinist models like the game of life, causality is then restricted to this 
level of ultimate reification. Remember we can perceive, enjoy and name the patterns, 
but only influence them as “Deus ex Machina” by starting a new world. Thus, by way of 
an algorithmic Life physics-based occationalism the world is recreated at each instant 
given the prior reification. 
I find it surprising that Dennett, on the one hand, notes that unfudging 
categorization is the product, the output of a variation absorbing process, and yet 
on the other assume an ultimate miraculously unfudged reality—be it determinist or 
indeterminist—in which “back stages” are per definition excluded as impossible. In other 
words, the question is why he does not pursue the possibility that a supreme causally-
efficacious “uncategorized categorizer” might be impossible, not simply in practice due to 
our limited perspective, but due to the fact that reification needs a limiting perspective. 
It might be that Dennett is so focused on showing that compatibilism is possible, that life 
and freedom could conceivably have evolved from a determinist universe without “back 
stage,” that he fails to consider whether this is a plausible story? At least this is what we 
see in his discussion of the “Game of life.” He argues, based on Conway’s proof, that one 
could embed a Universal Turing Machine in the life world. And therefore that a sort of 
self-replicating life could have evolved in a gigantic pixel space. He does worry about how 
to simulate variability, noise and mutation—i.e. re-create the fudge—in such a space: 
“Can a two dimensional world be noisy enough to support open-ended evolution, while 
still quiet enough to permit the designer parts to do their work unassailed? Nobody 
knows” (Dennett 2003, 50). He is right, we don’t know. But we also don’t know if God 
created us—and the fossil record. Some things might be possible but too unlikely to 
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spend time on, especially in the face of an alternative, that is. As it stands, I take it as a 
live option that there are no unmoved movers. We shall now look a bit at what it might 
mean if that were the case and we perhaps had interaction, hiding and revealing, and 
absorption and amplification all the way down.
4. Alternative views from within—emergence & interaction.
As mentioned Dennett suggests that his eternalist argument against possibilities 
works—ironically, for all possible worlds—and thus, whether the world is deterministic 
or indeterminist (Dennett 2003). In this way, he follows the free will debate consensus 
and takes classic determinism and indeterminism as the only metaphysical frameworks 
in town. Like Hume famously wrote: “As objects must either be conjoined or not, and 
as the mind must either be determined or not to pass from one object to another, it is 
impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity” (Hume 
1750). But is this true? Are necessity and chance, determinism and indeterminism our 
only metaphysical options? If we let go of the metaphysical stance assumption that the 
actual world has an ultimately reified causal level, then it seems that the possibility space 
would be open for other metaphysical options. One being that causality somehow takes 
place from within and exploits the gaps between appearance and reality. I shall in this 
article not attempt to develop such an alternative framework, but simply advocate for 
its possibility and briefly alert to the fact that I am not the first one objecting to the 
determinism-indeterminism ultimatum. Within the traditions of process philosophy, 
pragmatism, emergence and interactivist approaches many have pointed to metaphysical 
conceptions that does not fit the traditional eternalist metaphysical picture.19 In a recent 
article Mark Bickhard defends the empirical plausibility of a process based interactivist 
and emergentist view. He writes: 
Process, in fact, is now the dominant language of science. Every 
science has progressed beyond an initial conception of its phenomena 
in substance terms to understanding that they are in fact process 
phenomena. Fire is no longer modeled in terms of the substance 
phlogiston, but instead in terms of the process of combustion; heat 
no longer in terms of caloric, but in terms of random kinetic processes; 
19. See Vintiadis (2013) and Seibt (2012) for helpful recent overviews of respectively the emergentist tradition 
and process philosophy, but see also classic philosophy texts like e.g. Bergson (1896) and Whitehead 
(1929/1978), and of ecologists and theoretical biologists like e.g. Bateson (1979) and Rosen (1991).
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life no longer in terms of vital fluids, but in terms of special kinds of far 
from thermodynamic equilibrium processes. And so on. Every science, 
that is, with the exception of the sciences and philosophies of mind 
and persons. Here substance and structural views are still dominant. 
(Bickhard 2009, 553)
Thus, Bickhard points out how within nearly all sciences process-based and relational 
phenomena are taking center stage.20 Interestingly, for our purposes here he is well 
aware that many metaphysicians have a hard time letting go of atomistic, determinist 
and eternalist assumptions and getting their mind around the notion of a process 
metaphysics. 
The shift to a process metaphysics, however, induces major changes 
in our overall framework of assumptions : First, change becomes 
the explanatory default, and it is stability that requires explanation. 
Similarly, processes, unlike atoms or the “stuff” of substances, do not 
have inherent boundaries, and boundaries too, therefore, must be 
explained, not assumed. Second, processes have their causal powers 
in virtue of their organization. Organization cannot be delegitimated 
as a possible locus of causal power without eliminating all causality 
from the universe. But, if organization is a potential locus of causal 
power, then so is higher level organization. In particular, there is no 
metaphysical block to the possibility of emergent causal power in new 
organization. And third, if emergence is a metaphysical possibility, 
then the door is open to the possibility that normativity and mind are 
emergent. (Bickhard 2009, 553–4)
In other words, to use another of Dennett’s favorite expressions—we need to 
perform a “strange inversion of reason” to understand process metaphysics (Dennett 
2003, 47). Of course Dennett takes the Darwinian inversion of reason to be a bottom-
up compositional story, as opposed to a top-down story of intelligent design. What 
I, via Bickhard, propose is instead an inversion of reason away from reductionist 
foundationalism and “unexplained explainers” (be they large or small, physical or 
immaterial) to a view from within—all the way out so to speak. 
20. See e.g. Witzany (2014) for recent insights in the “pragmatic turn in biology.”
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Such accounts can and have been developed in different ways, typically given 
differing critical starting points. Physicist Lee Smolin and philosopher Roberto Unger 
have in recent works (Smolin 2013, Unger & Smolin 2014) challenged assumptions 
about a-historical pre-given deterministic laws existing externally to the fabric of actual 
processes. If rather laws are inherent to and evolving with the concrete physical processes 
and conditions, then we get a radically different “view from eternity” than the one 
Laplace and Dennett avail themselves off. Smolin (2013) also points to several much 
earlier proponents of the ‘laws evolve’ view. Dirac writes in 1939: “At the beginning of 
time the laws of Nature were probably very different from what they are now. Thus, we 
should consider the laws of Nature as continually changing with the epoch, instead of as 
holding uniformly throughout space-time.” Given Dennett’s view of freedom as evolving, 
why would he not also entertain the idea that laws and “transition rules” might evolve as 
well? Why the externalist view of a world that comes pre-categorized? This is precisely 
the aspect of universal laws that Charles Sanders Pierce found the most problematic all 
the way back in 1891:
To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by 
the mind and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing 
inexplicable and irrational, is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities 
are precisely the sort of facts that need to be accounted for…Now 
the only way to account for the laws of nature and for uniformity in 
general is to suppose them results of evolution. (Pierce 1891)
This point could not be more pertinent to the issue at hand, and the metaphysical 
assumption of “unexplained explainers” that each of the formulations of determinism 
that we have met contains. Like Bickhard wrote above, given a process view it is stability 
and borders, not change, that need to be explained, Pierce similarly suggests that 
it is uniformities and laws that call for an explanation. Further, Nancy Cartwright has 
from a internal stand point of how actual science unfolds, advocated for an alternative 
metaphysical view, which she calls “the dappled world” (Cartwright 1999). The idea is 
here not only that our current laws of nature “lie,” but that the world might simply be such 
that not even from the metaphysical stance are there universal and non-local regularities 
to be found. She has also worked on an Aristotelian inspired notion of “capacities” that 
could be congenial to an emergentist or “internalist” account of causation and thus an 
evolutionary view of action (Cartwright 1994).21 Thus, even though as Bickhard writes 
21. Cartwright is one the originators of the so-called Stanford school within the philosophy of science, which in 
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above the field of philosophy of mind seems to have stubbornly insisted on outdated and 
implausible metaphysical assumptions, alternatives do seem to exist—even if they are 
not neatly reified.
5. Conclusion: Evolving Dennett’s story beyond determinism 
Given Dennett’s own analyses of the causal efficacy of epistemic limitations, hidden 
complexities and two-bitser inscrutability, his philosophy seems to show us beyond the 
external metaphysical stance. If there is no layer of reality without a back stage, where 
appearance always equal reality, then we might suggest that all causal interactions 
“amplify” certain variations and “absorb” others. In other words, Dennett’s account is in 
many ways congenial to an internalist—or perspectival, interactivist and emergentist—
inversion, were all causal effects might rely on some recognition and response. If the 
world—like the front stage of Conway’s game of life—were such that all reality appears 
at each instant, i.e. reality and appearance never come apart, then this “internalist” idea of 
causality would make no difference. But imagine a world—perhaps like ours—with mind-
boggling multiplicities of spatio-temporal timescales and ways of hiding and revealing. 
What if no fundamental level is to be found—but rather each level, each interaction 
has its own “dark matter” and even the “Higgs field” is not an “uncaused cause.” Maybe 
in such a world there are no neat “states” and “instants,” where everything can reveal 
all its aspects or properties. In such a world there would always be some gaps between 
appearance and reality, between what is of consequence in current interactions and what 
“it there.” Such a temporal world of situated causalities I think would be more conducive 
to evolution, emergence, change and the odd combination of noise and quiet Dennett is 
looking to program into Conway’s game of life. 
If Dennett’s compatibilism and his evolutionary account of free will are revisited 
with such considerations in mind then it looks as if parts of the possibility space have 
been ignored. Maybe a biological and historical view like Dennett’s allows us to invent 
a new free will position that does not rely on traditional libertarian routes of claiming 
extra-physical determining forces (dualist) or non-determined (random) effects. The 
question is whether a dynamic pluralistic world always getting its causality from actual 
interactions, with limited relational recognition, can provide the grounds we need to re-
interpret how real-time action choice and determination might be possible at the human 
level. More specifically, whether the causal consequences of teleological perception, 
many ways is united not simply by geography but by its challenge to eternalist, essentialist and reductionist 
views. See e.g. Dupré (1995). 
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memory, anticipation and interaction feedback, can give rise to forms of emergence that 
we might think of as having downward or—as I prefer—outward efficacy.22
Some might want to argue that this proposal is not actually that different 
from Dennett’s, as he might be read not necessarily as a classic determinist but as a 
metaphysical agnostic. This might be so, but then this article is making a significant 
contribution to the clarification of Dennett’s position and its commitments and 
explanatory merits. His texts are, as we have seen, ripe with reductionist and eternalist 
models, which indicates that he at least in practice is ignoring other metaphysical 
possibilities such as emergentist, interactivist and process positions. 
I propose that the possibility of such positions matter—also to our conception of our 
own actions. Instead of saying, as Dennett does, that we have perceived opportunities 
because we are epistemologically limited, we can now say that our epistemological 
limitations are as casually efficacious as anything else can claim to be. The point is that 
in a world that cannot be reduced to a level of ultimate and inherently transparent 
compositional “parts,” every interaction might be only partially revealing. The world of 
epistemology and metaphysics, of appearance and reality, phenomena and noumena, 
now interacts as no processes of reification are externalized from the causal web. This 
might allow for a changed perspective on how our action choices matter. The question is 
if our evolved abilities to predict, and flexibly integrate horizontal cultural influences, and 
inhibit and hide impulses, are the sources of emergent effects in the present, i.e. shape 
the causal fabric of the world in ways that are as determining as they are determined. The 
proposal is thus not that our actions are “indetermined” in any classic sense but rather 
that they both—to use Dennett’s terminology—amplify and absorb variability. We can 
actively and purposively hide and reveal causally efficacious aspects of “ourselves” and the 
world.23 Dennett is right to highlight our complex and bastardized genealogies, as this 
heterogeneity and multiplicity of the self holds “it’s” generative power. It is not just that 
we “are the loop” as Dennett says, but further that we constantly dynamically change 
and choose what pertains to our causally efficacious loops. Dennett aims to show that 
freedom can evolve from entirely unfree atomistic parts, and accordingly likes to describe 
22. An important aspect to explore of such a hypothesis would be whether in a world without a bottom layer, 
one might expect both order and disorder—regularity and variability—to be constantly be produced as 
irreducible actual concrete interactions would determine the outcomes in real time. This does not seem to 
be the case in Conway’s game of life—here the finite determinist worlds move towards more order. 
23. Note here the similarity to Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) the insistence on the role of invisibility in visibility as 
well as his critique (1965) of what he sees as Bergson’s (1896) purely positive process philosophy. 
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us in mechanistic terms as composed of “micro-robots” and “micro-factories.” However, 
we might—perhaps like the bacterium—in part owe our freedom to not being the sum 
of a fixed set of finite parts, but rather constantly self-creating open systems. Thus, 
autonomy and emergent novelty might be possible. 
I want to reiterate that I do not claim to have a theory of free will. My aim in this 
present an article is merely to reveal theoretical possibilities that have been hidden by the 
insistence on fully transparent discrete and eternalist metaphysical perspectives. If there 
is no floor to the universe, then there might always be a gap between appearance and 
reality. This would undermine all classic formulations of determinism it seems. However, I 
tried to show that the potential absence of a metaphysical “back stage,” suggest that our 
action choices might indeed happen in real time and determine what is to come, possibly 
by way of new emergent effects. Thus, the elbow room of human agency comes not 
only from the fact that our procedural selves are “smeared over time and space” but also 
from the constant games of peek-a-boo where our worlds and we—in all our bastardized 
multiplicities—are never fully hidden nor fully transparent or expressed.24 These ideas 
might allow for the development of an ignored kind of free will worth wanting, and I 
shall be curious to see if some indeterminists would agree. After all, as Dennett is, I am 
puzzled by the desire to have one’s actions to be without any precursors. And, I wonder 
whether many do not simply desire—as James (1897) famously expressed it—“that the 
issue is decided nowhere else than here and now. That is what gives the palpitating reality 
to our moral life and makes it tingle as Mr Mallock says, with so strange and elaborate 
excitement.”
24. Bergson - and other who have made similar claims - might thus exactly be wrong to propose that the free 
action was an expression of the entire ‘self’. As he his self later pointed out; all actions simplify. (Bergson 
1889)
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